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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND DOMESTIC LAW FOCUSING 
ON U.S. LAW, WITH SOME 
REFERENCE TO ISRAELI LAW 
Malvina Halberstam* 
It is a great honor and privilege to be here to participate in the 
celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court of 
Israel and the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. I have very strong feelings about both. 
In Siberia and Kirgistan, where my family and I survived World 
War II, we could not even have imagined the State of Israel that 
exists today. To keep up our spirits, when there was no food or 
heat, my mother, T]"V, would sing in Hebrew. The lines of one wist­
ful song have always stayed with me, though I've never heard any­
one else sing it: "Omrim yesh na aretz, Aretz kulah shemesh, Aifo 
he ha'aretz, Ayeh hu hashemesh?" ["They say there is a land. A 
land full of sunshine. Where is that land? Where is that sun­
shine?"].^ Who would have even dreamed, in those dark days of 
World War Two, that less than ten years later the State of Israel 
would be established and that only fifty years after that we would 
have the great State of Israel that exists today! It has served as a 
refuge for millions of Jews from every corner of the world, fulfilling 
the prophecies of Yeshayahu and Yermiyahu. It has not only sur­
vived, but has thrived, despite constant attacks by its enemies. 
That it has done so as a democracy, and has succeeded in preserv­
ing fundamental human rights to the extent that it has, is a credit to 
Israel and a tribute to its courts. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights^ is one of the 
great documents in the history of humankind. It proclaims that the 
individual has rights. The right to "life, liberty and security of per­
son;"^ "to equal protection of the law;'"* and "to an effective rem-
* Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. This address 
was given at the Jubilee Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Israeli Supreme Court 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was held in Jerusalem, Israel, July 
5-7, 1998. 
1 Author's translation. 
2 See G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
3 Id. art. 3. 
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edy before a competent national tribunal. It provides that "no 
one shall be held in slavery;'"^ "no one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or pimishment;"^ and 
"no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest."® Although at the 
time of its adoption it did not create legally binding rights,' it was 
the basis for the Covenants that did create such rights. But, per­
haps even more importantly, it was the basis for a revolution in the 
way individual rights are viewed by international law. At the time 
of its adoption, it was generally agreed that only states had rights 
under international law. Today, it is universally accepted that indi­
viduals have rights which the state cannot take away. 
It is appropriate that the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the fiftieth anni­
versary of the Supreme Court of Israel are combined in this Con­
ference. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
State of Israel were dreams fifty years ago; both are realities today 
far beyond the hopes of their dreamers. 
I have been asked to address international human rights and do­
mestic law. I will do so focusing primarily on U.S. law, with some 
reference to Israeli law. 
Most of the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Some are 
specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Civil War 
amendments; others are based on judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution. Indeed, Eleanor Roosevelt, who was the driving 
force behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, based it 
on the Bill of Rights. 
^ Id. art. 7. 
5 Id. art. 8. 
® Id. art. 4. 
Id. art. 5. 
® Id. art. 9. 
' On presenting the Declaration to the U.N. General Assembly, Eleanor Roosevelt 
said, 
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that 
we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a treaty; it 
is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement 
of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of human 
rights and freedoms ... to serve as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples of all nations. 
General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Human Rights: Statement by Mrs. Franklin D 
Roosevelt, 19 DEP'T ST. BULL. 751 (1948) (emphasis added). See also Dean Rusk, A Com­
ment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311, 313 (1981). 
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United States law goes far in protecting individual rights, perhaps 
further than the laws of any country in the world. I had long as­
sumed that Israeli law was similar to U.S. law insofar as fundamen­
tal freedoms are concerned. Following the Oslo accords, and 
particularly following the tragic assassination of Prime Minister 
Rabin, I discovered that that was not true - at least with respect to 
freedom of speech. There were restrictions on expression and on 
demonstrations in Israel that, in the United States, would clearly 
violate the First Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. I was shocked to read, for example, that the Minister of 
Education warned that "educators who express extreme right-wing 
views will be suspended,"^" and called on "students and parents to 
report on what is happening in the schools," noting that some re­
ports had already been received and some teachers were being in­
terviewed by the police.^^ It brought back memories of my early 
school days in Soviet Russia, when we were extolled by "Comrade 
Stalin" to report our parents and teachers if they criticized the gov­
ernment. Other examples included a warning by the then Attorney 
General to newspapers that if they reported statements that consti­
tuted "incitement" they would be held criminally liable,^^ and a 
demand by the Religious Affairs Minister demanded that rabbis 
who signed a statement that it is forbidden to give up any parts of 
Eretz Yisrael remove their names from the document or face disci­
plinary measures." 
The restrictions and warnings clearly had a chilling effect on ex­
pression. For example, when, at a dinner at a friend's house, sev­
eral of us expressed dismay at what was happening, the husband of 
one friend said in a very agitated voice, "I want you to stop talking 
about this. You, Malvina, will return to the U.S. in a few days, but 
my wife will remain here and may be arrested." The atmosphere 
was captured in a cartoon, showing a dentist saying to his patient in 
the dentist's chair, "I realize opening your mouth is dangerous 
10 Batsheva Tzar and Liat Collins, Turn in Teachers Who Express Extremist Views, JE­
RUSALEM POST, NOV. 15,1995. 
11 Oscar Prager, Police State, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 18, 1995, at 6. (Letter to the 
editor). 
12 Ben-Yair Tells Media: No Quotes From Inciters, JERUSALEM POST, NOV. 9,1995, at 3. 
13 Herb Keinon and Itim, Shetreet to Force Rabbis to Remove Names From Anti-Gov­
ernment Ad, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 25, 1995, at 2. 
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these days, but there is no other way I can treat your teeth."^"^ 
When I asked a young, obviously very bright, recent Israeli law 
graduate whether he thought there was freedom of speech in 
Israel, he replied, "Of course there is freedom of speech. It just 
depends on what you say." He did not realize the irony of his 
statement. 
I refer to this not to criticize Israel, but to raise a cautionary note. 
Every country tends to overreact in time of crisis. Even the United 
States, which I consider to be one of the greatest democracies in 
history, reacted to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor by put­
ting its Japanese citizens into camps.^^ The Japanese-Americans 
confined in these camps had done nothing wrong. Many of those 
confined were second and third generation American citizens and 
some had family members serving in the armed forces of the 
United States. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court held this constitu­
tional.^^ In contrast, Israel, to the best of my knowledge, took no 
action against its Arab citizens who, according to media reports, 
danced on the roofs when Saddam Hussein fired missiles at Israel 
during the Gulf War. It shows remarkable self restraint and re-
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 5, 1995. 
15 Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Starts to Dust off a Dark Spot in History for All to See, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2,1998, at A6 ("In all, 10 internment camps in inland areas of California and 
in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Utah and Wyoming held about 120,000 Japanese-
Americans who were interned for more than three years under Executive Order 9066, 
which President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued in February 1942 in the name of national 
security."). 
1® Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
14 
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sped for freedom of expression for a state to take no adion against 
those who publidy rejoice at its imminent destruction, while that 
state is literally under fire. But sadly, as already noted, Israel did 
take action against Jews who spoke out and demonstrated against 
the Oslo Accords, restricting their freedom of expression. Hope­
fully, the Knesset will enact a basic law, or the Supreme Court will 
interpret an existing law, to prevent such restrictions on freedom of 
expression in the future. Every state tends to overreact in time of 
crisis, but that is exactly why it is imperative that there be laws 
protecting freedom of expression. 
It has been suggested that U.S. law may go too far in protecting 
individual freedom. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the 
First Amendment to protect hate speech, even incitement to vio­
lence, unless there is a "clear and present danger" that it will be 
acted upon.^^ As a result, the United States could not prohibit 
incitement to genocide or incitement to racial discrimination, as re­
quired by the Genocide Convention^® and the Racial Discrimina­
tion Convention,^' respectively, and had to enter reservations with 
respect to each.^° The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures^^ to 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919). 
18 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 3(c) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
19 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 4 [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention]. 
20 The Senate Resolution giving advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the Genocide 
Convention includes the following reservation; "[N]othing in the Convention requires or 
authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States." S. EXEC. REP. NO. 
99-2, at 27 (1985). The Senate Resolution giving advice and consent to U.S. ratification of 
the Racial Discrimination Convention states: 
I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations: 
(1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive pro­
tections of individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accord­
ingly, the United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, 
in particular under Articles 4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adop­
tion of legislation or any other measures, to the extent that they are protected 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
140 CONG. REC. S7634 (daily ed., June 7, 1994). 
21 The Fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma­
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
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require exclusion of evidence^^ — something the amendment does 
not provide for by its terms — with the result that persons who 
have committed the most horrendous crimes may go free, even 
though there is incontrovertible evidence to establish their guilt. 
This may happen, even though a majority of aU the judges who 
consider the case conclude, as did the police officer on the scene, 
that there was probable cause to search, if the Supreme Court de­
cides 5 to 4 that there was not.^'^ It is difficult to see what possible 
deterrent effect exclusion of the evidence under those circuni-
stances can have. As Justice Cardozo once put it,^ "The criminal is 
to go free because the Constable has blundered."^^ 
While the U.S. protects individual rights to a very high degree 
under its domestic law, it has been very slow in ratifying interna­
tional conventions on human rights. The U.S. only ratified the Ge­
nocide Convention in 1988,^^ even though it was submitted to the 
Senate for its advice and consent by President Truman in 1949 
and was supported by almost every president. Democrat or Repub­
lican, thereafter.^® One of the long-time arguments made against 
ratification of these conventions was that ratification would violate 
the rights of states, which, under the U.S. Constitution, regulate 
much of the conduct that is the subject of these conventions. How­
ever as far back as 1920, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Missouri 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
22 Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
23 See e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
24 See, e.g.. United States v. Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In that case, ten judges - the 
district judge, six judges of the court of appeals and three Justices of the Supreme C^urt 
held there was probable cause, and seven judges — two judges on the Court of Appeals 
and five Justices of the Supreme Court - held there was no probable cause (Justi^ Mar­
shall did not participate in the decision of the Supreme Court). See id. at 430 (B ac , ., 
dissenting). 
25 People V. Defore, 249 N.Y. 13, 20 (1926). 
26 The Senate gave its advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the Genocide Conven­
tion in 1986, see S. Res. 347,99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S1355-81 (daily ed. Feb. 
19 1986) but conditioned it on the enactment of implementing legislation by Congress. 
Such legislation was enacted on November 4,1988, see Genocide 
tion Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100-606,102 Stat. 3045 (1988) (rodified at 
18 U S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1988)), and the Convention was ratified by President Reagan on 
November 14,1988, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 367 (1996) (entered into 
force for the U.S. on Feb 23,1989). 
27 5ee 95 CONG. REC. 57825 (June 16,1949). 
28 See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), S. fep. 
No. 333,100'" Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4156,4157 (citing 
Presidents Keimedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan). 
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V. Holland,a landmark decision by Justice Holmes, that the enu­
merated powers of Congress are not a limitation on the treaty 
power; that the U.S. can enter into a treaty even though it deals 
with matters not within the enumerated powers of Congress. Fur­
thermore, Congress may then enact legislation to implement that 
treaty, even if in the absence of the treaty the matter would be one 
that was within the powers reserved to the states and not subject to 
regulation by Congress. An attempt to change that by a Constitu­
tional Amendment, the so-called Bricker Amendment,^" which 
provided that "[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in 
the United States only through legislation which would be valid in 
the absence of a treaty,"^^ failed. 
The United States has now ratified a number of human rights 
treaties, including the Genocide Convention,^^ the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,^^ the Covention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination,^'' and the Convention Against Tor-
ture.^^ It has not yet ratified the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.^® That convention 
has, however, been submitted to the Senate for its advice and con-
sent.^^ All these ratifications have included reservations and some 
commentators are very critical of the reservations.^® 
29 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
30 See S.J. RES. 1, 83d Cong. (1953), 99 CONG. REC. 6777 (1953). 
31 Id. 
32 Genocide Convention, supra note 18. 
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (opened for 
signature Dec. 16,1966, entered into force March 23,1976). 
34 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 19. 
35 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 1904, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 35, U.N. Doc. AJ 
5515 (1963), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (opened for signature Mar. 7,1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 
1969) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
36 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/180 
(1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 
entered into force Sept. 3,1981) [hereinafter CEDAWJ. 
32 It was first submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent by President Carter in 
1980, see Letter of Transmittal by President Carter to the Senate, Exec. Doc. R, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), and again in 1994 by President Clinton, see Convention on the Elim­
ination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. 
on Foreign Relations 21, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). 
38 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away 
With It, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 90 (1989); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights 
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995). 
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With respect to several conventions, the resolution giving Senate 
advice and consent to ratification also includes a declaration that 
the convention is not self-executing. That means that it cannot be 
invoked as law in U.S. courts unless implementing legislation is 
adopted.^® Such a declaration was included in the Senate resolu­
tions giving advice and consent to ratification of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights^" and the Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination^^ and was proposed for the resoludon on 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women,which is still pending in the Senate. No imple­
menting legislation has been adopted either for the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights or for the Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination,^^ and it is clear from the hearings that 
there is no intention to adopt implementing legislation for the Con­
vention on Women's Rights.'^'* 
International law does not require states to make treaties self-
executing.''^ It does, however, require states to act in good faith.''^ 
39 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111(3) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international 
law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-self executing' 
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation. ). 
See also Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimina­
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 
'*^40^5EE^L38 CONG. REC. S4781 (April 2,1992) (statement of Senator Pell). For the text 
of the Senate resolution giving advice and consent to the Covenant, see id. at '•783-84 For 
criticism of the non-self-executing declaration with respect to U.S. ratification of the Cove­
nant on Civil & Political Rights, see Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Pot-
icy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993); and Henkin, supra note 38. 
41 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discnmina-
tion- Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), at 
13 (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State). For the text of 
Senate resolution giving advice and consent to the Convention, see 140 CONG. REC. S7B34 
(June 24, 1994). . j , 
42 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-38, at 3. For a discussion of the reservations, declarations 
and understandings to CEDAW, see Halberstam, supra note 39. 
43 See Henkin, supra note 37, at 347. . yin v 
44 See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Convention on the Elimination of All Foms 
of Discrimination Against Women, S. REP. NO. 38, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994), p. . 
45 See Louis Henkin et al.. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 140 (2d ea. 
46^ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27 (1969), 
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 26 ("[E]very treaty . . . must be performed . . . m good 
faith."); also Nuclear Test Cases (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 LC.J. 4,19 (Dec 20) (noting tha 
good faith is "one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations"). 
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While most of the rights provided in the above conventions are 
also protected by existing U.S. laws, to the extent that there are 
rights in a convention that are not covered by existing U.S. law, the 
declaration that the convention is non-self-executing, coupled with 
an intent not to enact implementing legislation, raises serious ques­
tions of good faith under international law. 
In my view, it also contravenes Article VI of the U.S. Constitu­
tion. Article VI provides: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States . . . and all 
treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
judges in every state shall be bound thereby. . . N 
This language, making treaties the supreme law of the land, and the 
parallel provisions in article III giving federal courts jurisdiction in 
cases involving treaties, was adopted to avoid the problems that 
existed under the Articles of Confederation, which had left the en­
forcement of treaties to the legislatures of each of the states."^® 
The history of the clause makes clear that the framers intended 
treaties to have immediate effect as domestic law"*® and to be inter­
preted and applied by the courts "like all other laws."^° Thus, 
Hamilton wrote in the Federalists, "Treaties of the United States, 
to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of 
the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must like 
all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determination."^^ Justice 
Story wrote. 
It is . . . indispensable that [treaties] should have the obligation 
and force of a law, that they may be executed by the judicial 
power and be obeyed like other laws. ... If they are supreme 
laws, courts of justice will enforce them directly in all cases, to 
which they can be judicially applied.^^ 
The proposition that in the United States treaties may be self-
executing or non-self-executing is generally attributed to Justice 
U.S. CONST, art. VI. 
See Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 695, 699 (1995) (quoting Justice Story). 
49 For a review of this history, see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 760, 761-62, 764 (1988). 
50 Id. 
51 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in Paust, supra note 
49, at 762. 
52 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
695 (1833). 
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Marshall's decision in Foster & Elam v. NeilsonP However, these 
terms (self-executing/non-self-executing) do not even appear in the 
opinion. Nor did Marshall suggest that the Senate has the constitu­
tional authority to provide by declaration (or reservation) that a 
treaty ratified by the United States shall not be applied by the 
courts On the contrary, he stressed that unlike the situation in 
other states, in the United States treaties have the force of law as 
soon as they are ratified and must be applied by the courts. Justice 
Marshall said: 
A treaty is in its nature a contract between nations, not a 
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to 
be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-tem-
torial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power ot 
the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States a 
different principle is established. Our constitution declares a 
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded 
in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, when­
ever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative 
provision.^* 
It is only where the treaty by its terms requires legislative action 
that it cannot be applied by the courts directly. Marshall's position, 
that treaties that require legislative action by their terms cannot be 
enforced directly by the Courts, was later transformed into a rule 
that in the United States treaties may be self-executing or not, de­
pending on the intent of the Senate in giving advice and consent 
and the intent of the President in ratifying the treaty.^^ 
Although it has become accepted black letter law that in the 
United States treaties may be self-executing or non-self-execut­
ing,®® a number of prominent scholars and commentators have re­
cently challenged or questioned the constitutionality of a Senate 
53 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1820). 
54 Id. at 314 (emphasis added); see also U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,418 (1886); Head 
Money Cases 112 U.S. 580,598-99 (1884) ("A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act ot 
S.I;Twhenever l,s provtoL pre^ib. . nite by wWch .he .ighu of hie pn.e.e 
citizM or subject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced 
in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision fm the rase before 
U LT, "ohli to a as, 50 F.3a 1567,1573 11th to. ««) 
Rauscher, 119 at 418) ("Under our Constitution ... a treaty is the law of the land and the 
equivalent of an act of the legislature."). 
55 See Vasquez, supra note 48, at 704; Faust, supra note 49, at 767 ("Later commenta­
tors have distorted [Marshall's] meaning "). 
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 111. 
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declaration that a treaty is not self-executing.^'^ Professor Jordan 
Faust states: 
The distinction found in certain cases between "self-executing" 
and "non-self-executing" treaties is a judicially invented notion 
that is patently inconsistent with express language in the Consti­
tution affirming that "a// treaties ... shall be the supreme law of 
the land."^8 
Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott state: 
The framers of the Constitution intended that treaties be given 
direct effect in U.S. law when by their terms and context they 
are self-executing. An ancillary power of the Senate to deny 
self-execution contradicts this intent.^^ 
Professor Damrosch states: 
A Senate declaration purporting to negate the legal effect of 
otherwise self-executing treaty provisions is constitutionally 
questionable as a derogation from the ordinary application of 
Article VI of the Constitution.^ 
Although the Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law ap­
pears to accept the validity of a non-self-executing declaration by 
the Senate,®^ Professor Louis Henkin, its Chief Reporter, has re­
cently written, "such a declaration is against the spirit of the Con-
57 See Paust, supra note 49; Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope 
of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHICAGO-KENT 
L. REV. 571, 631 (1991); Lori Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning 
"Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 515, 516-
18 (1991). See also International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 89 (1980) (statement of Professor Oscar 
Schachter) ("I see no reason why the United States, which has a clear constitutional provi­
sion making treaties the supreme law of the land, should deprive citizens of the United 
States of the advantage of that constitutional provision."); Note, The Domestic Legal Effect 
of Declarations that Treaty Provisions are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 233, 233-34 
(1979) ("This Note argues that the declarations [that a treaty is non-self-executing] are of 
dubious validity . . . ."). 
58 Paust, supra note 49, at 1 (emphasis in original). 
59 Riesenfeld and Abbott, supra note 57, at 599. 
69 Damrosch, supra note 57, at 527. Damrosch adds, "accordingly, it should not be 
sustained unless there is some constitutionally based justification for the Senate to inject 
itself into the question." Id. at 527. She then proceeds to discuss and refute various argu­
ments that might be made to justify a non-self-executing declaration. She concludes that 
"it would be far preferable for the Senate to discontinue the device of non-self-executing 
treaty declarations. . . . The effectiveness of international law would be strengthened by 
eliminating this unnecessary impediment to judicial enforcement of treaties." Id. at 532. 
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § lll(4)(b), and cmt. h. For a critique of the 
reasoning of the Restatement, see Vasquez, supra note 48, at 707. 
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stitution; it may be unconstitutional."®^ He adds in a footnote, "If 
what I wrote might be interpreted as supporting a general principle 
that would allow the President, or the Senate, to declare all treaties 
non-self-executing, that is not my opinion. 
Although the Supreme Court has stated that in the U.S. a 
treaty may be self-executing or non-self-executing, it has never 
ruled on the enforceability of a treaty provision which by its terms 
was self-executing, but which the Senate declared to be non-self-
executing. In Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Com­
mission,^ the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held, 
in a two to one decision, that a reservation that would have had the 
effect of making a treaty provision non-self-executing was invalid.®® 
That a practice has long been assumed to be constitutional does not 
make it so, as the Supreme Court made clear in I.N.S. v. Chadha.^ 
In that case, the Court held unconstitutional the legislative veto, 
even though it had been used in nearly 200 statues between 1932 
and 1975.®^ Thus, the Court might well hold that if a treaty (or 
treaty provision), by its terms, establishes rights or imposes obliga­
tions that can be enforced by the courts directly, a declaration bar­
ring the courts from enforcing such rights would violate Articles III 
and VI of the Constitution.®® 
Moreover, as the State Department acknowledges, "declaring 
the Convention to be non-self-executing in no way lessens the obli­
gation of the United States to comply with its provisions as a mat­
ter of international law."®^ Therefore, to the extent that U.S. law is 
not consistent with the Convention, and no implementing legisla-
62 Henkin, supra note 38, at 347-48. 
63 Id. at 347 n.26. 
64 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957). 
65 The case involved a reservation in the Senate Resolution giving advice and consent 
to U.S. ratification of the Niagara Waters Treaty with Canada, Treaty Relating to Uses of 
Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 694, providing that "no project for 
redevelopment of the United States' share of such waters shall be undertaken until . . . 
specifically authorized by Act of Congress." Id. at 699. For a discussion of that case, see 
Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty Is a Treaty is a Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L 51, 55-58 (1992). 
66 462 U.S. at 919 (1983). 
67 Id. at 944 ("The fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful 
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution."). ... 
68 For a suggestion that U.S. courts could ignore such a declaration, "since it is not part 
of the treaty," see RICHARD E. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 229 (2d ed. 
1981). If the treaty by its terms requires legislation then the non-self-executing declaration 
would not be unconstitutional; it would merely be superfluous. 
69 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-38, at 49 (1994). 
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tion is adopted, the U.S. would be in violation of its international 
obligations. One of the purposes of Article VI, however, was to 
avoid precisely that result.^" 
In sum, U.S. domestic law guarantees to a very large extent 
most of the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and amplified and made legally binding in the vari­
ous covenants on human rights. The U.S. has, however, long re­
frained from ratifying the covenants and now that the U.S. has 
ratified a number of human rights treaties it has included a declara­
tion, with respect to several, stating that the treaty in question is 
non-self-executing. That declaration raises serious questions under 
international law and under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution 
and should be discontinued. 
Thus, both the United States and Israel can take great pride in 
the protection of human rights by domestic law, but in both further 
action is essential: in the United States ratification and implemen­
tation of human rights treaties, in Israel protection of freedom of 
expression. 
•70 See Vasquez, supra note 48, at 699. 
